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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Labor Law-Employee's Rights Under UnionEmployer Agreements.
In the United States agreements between unions and employers
are very generally held as between the parties to be valid contracts,
and decrees in equity have been handed down at the request of the
other party enjoining a breach by the union 1 or by the employer.2 In
one instance damages were recovered by the employer against the
union.3 It appears by a dictum in a recent case, however, that such
4
agreements are unenforceable in England and in Canada.
Where it is held that a union-employer agreement is not enforceable by the parties thereto, it naturally follows that it is unenforceable
by any third party, 5 unless it be held that the union was the agent of
the individual employee. This contention of agency has been expressly repudiated. 6 Two cases in the United States have been found
which, while holding the contract valid as between the union and the
employer, refuse to an individual employee any right of action based
thereon. 7 It is to be observed, however, that the Mississippi Court
reversed this holding in a later decision ;8 and that the other decision
comes from a federal district court in North Dakota, 9 and may,
perhaps, be reversed on appeal.
The great weight of authority in the United States is to the effect
that the individual employee does have enforceable rights under a
union-employer agreement. This conclusion is reached by either of
'Burgess v. Georgia F. & A. Ry Co., 148 Ga. 415, 96 S. E. 864 (1918) ; Gilchrist Co. v. Metal Polishers, etc. Union, 113 Atl. 320 (N. J. Eq. 1919) ; Meltzer
v. Kaminer, 227 N. Y. Supp. 459, 131 Misc. 813 (1927).
'Schlesinger v. Quinto, 194 N. Y. Supp. 401, 201 App. Div. 487 (1922);
Goldman v. Cohen, 227 N. Y. Supp. 311, 222 App. Div. 631 (1928) ; Weber v.
Nasser, 286 Pac. 1047 (Cal. 1930).
Nederlandsch Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappy v. Stevedores' &
Longshoremens' Benevolent Assoc., 265 Fed. 397 (E. D. La. 1920).
'Young v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., (1931) App. Cas. 83, in which, in
contrast to the prevalent liberal view of industrial relations existing in England,
Lord Russell of the Privy Council says, "if an employer refused to observe the
rule, the effective sequel would be, not an action by any employee, not even an
action by Division No. 4 (the union) against the employer for specific performance or damages, but the calling of a strike until the grievance was
remedied." Commented upon, Note (1932) 26 ILL. L. REv. 922.
'See Young v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., supra note 4, at 89 ("By itself
it constitutes no contract between any individual employee and the company
which employs him").
SBurnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., 180 Mo. 241, 79 S. W. 136 (1904) ; Piercy
v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923).
' Chambers v Davis, 128 Miss. 613, 91 So. 346 (1922); Kessell v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 51 F. (2d) 304 (W. D. N. D. 1931).
'Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co. v. Sideboard, 133 So. 667 (Miss. 1931).
'Kessell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra note 7.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
two theories, 10 viz., (1) that the union-employer agreement establishes a usage which automatically becomes a part of every employee's
individual contract of employment," and (2) that the individual employee is a third party beneficiary.' 2 The same rule of law applies
whether the employee is seeking damages for injuries caused by a
breach of the agreement,' 3 or is seeking specific performance of some
particular stipulation of the agreement.' 4
The earlier cases refused the employee a recovery on the ground
that, since he had not bound himself for any specific time, but rather
could quit at will, there was no mutuality of obligation, and consequently no binding contract as to him.' 5 All but a few of the cases
found that have been reported since 1914,16 however, permit the
employee to recover. The contention of no mutuality is either
0One case was found which was decided on the basis that the employee acquired no enforceable rights unless he had ratified the agreement. West v. B.
& 0. Ry. Co., 103 W. Va. 422, 137 S. E. 654 (1927).
'Moody v. Model Window Glass Co., 145 Ark. 197, 224 S. W. 436 (1920);
Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. W. (2d) 692 (1928) ; St.
Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Booker, 287 S. W. 130 (Tex. 1926) ; Gregg v. Starks,
188 Ky. 834, 224 S. W. 459 (1920). Several of the decisions found say nothing
about the basis of the employee's right, but take for granted that there exists
a valid contract as to the individual employee containing the terms of the unionemployer agreement, thus implying the incorporation by usage. Mostell v. Salo,
140 Ark. 408, 215 S. W. 583 (1919) ; Gary v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. 37 Ga.
App. 744, 141 S. E. 819 (1928) ; Hall v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 28
S. W. (2d) 687 (Mo. 1930) ; Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., supra note 6.
Gulla v. Barton, 149 N. Y. 952, 164 App. Div. 293 (1914); Yazoo &
M. V. Ry. Co., supra note 8; H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426,
155 N. E. 154 (1926) ; Marshall v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co., 162 S. E. 348
(S. C. 1931); Johnson v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 161 S. E. 473 (S. C. 1931).
13Judgments
have been returned in favor of the employee in actions for
damages for wrongful discharge. Marshall v. Charleston W. C. Ry. Co., supra
note 12; Johnson v. Am. Ry. Express Co., supra note 12; Gary v. Central of
Georgia Ry. Co., supra note 11; 'H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, supra note 12; Hall
v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., supra note 11; Cross Mountain Coal Co.
v. Ault, supra note 11. And in actions for payment of less than the agreed
union wage. Mostell v. Salo, supra note 11; United States Daily Publishing
Corp. v. Nichols, 32 F. (2d) 834 (D. C. C. A. 1929) ; Moody v. Model Window
Glass Co., supra note 11; Gula v. Barton, supra note 12; Yazoo & M. V. Ry.
Co. v. Sideboard, supra note 8.
4
Judgments have been recovered enforcing specific performance of the
contract as to seniority rights. Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., smpra note 6;
Gregg v. Starks, supra note 11.
St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S. W. 902, 36
L. R A. 467 (1897) ; Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 52 Ky. 711,
154 S. W. 47, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 98 (1913).
" 1914 seems to mark a definite turn-about, as all the cases found decided up
to Hudson v. Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., supra note 15, refuse recovery
to the employee; whereas, with the exception of Kessell v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., supra note 7, West v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., supra note 10; and Chambers v.
Davis, supra note 7, all the cases found since Gulla v. Barton, supra note 12,
give judgment for the employee.
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ignored 1 7 or expressly repudiated.' 8 One early case held that the
mere fact that the parties knew the terms of the agreement could not
be construed as a contract to work under those terms, even though
the employee was a member of the union.' 9 The later cases, however,
carry the implied incorporation of the union-employer agreement to
the extent of permitting a recovery of union wages by the employee
where there existed no contract between the particular employer and
the union, because the parties knew of the existing wage rate as established by the union-employer agreement obtaining in that trade, and
20
because no other wage was specified.
Only a few courts have based the employee's right of action on
the theory that he is a third party beneficiary. The objection that
the employee's name does not appear on the face of the agreement is
held not to affect this right.2 1 This theory of third party beneficiary
has been carried so far as to permit the employee to recover the union
rate of wages, even though he, not knowing of the agreement, had
subsequently entered into a separate contract with the employer at a
22
lesser wage.
Under both the theory of incorporation by usage23 and the theory
of third party beneficiary, 2 4 the courts have reached the seemingly
anomalous result that a "non-union" employee can recover under the
union-employer agreement as well as a "union" employee. The
opinion in Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Sideboard25 shows that the basis
for this apparent strain on the intention of the parties is a desire on
1 Mostell v. Salo, supra note 11; H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, supra note 12;
Hall v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., supra note 11.
'Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, supra note 11; St. Louis B. & M. Ry.
Co. v. Booker, supra note 11, at 859 ("We cannot agree with appellant that the
agreement is unenforceable for lack of mutuality or want of consideration. This
promise of the employer is a part of the consideration inducing employees to
enter and remain in the service, and the continuous performance of the duties
of their employment is a valuable consideration to the railway.")
Burnetta v. Marceline Coal Co., supra note 6.
United Daily Publishing Corp v. Nichols, supra note 13; Model Window
Glass Co. v. Moody, 150 Ark. 142, 233 S. W. 1092 (1921).
'Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co. v. Sideboard, supra note 8; Gulla v. Barton, supra
note 12. See H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, supra note 12, at 157 ("Where the
name of the third person does not appear to the contract, if the terms are made
for the benefit of such person the provisions of the contract are enforceable").
Gulla v. Barton, supra note 12.
Gregg v. Starks, supra note 11.
Yazoo M. V. Ry. Co. V. Sideboard, supra note 8.
'Supra note 8, which holds that the union meant to include the non-union
employees as third party beneficiaries, on the grounds that since the agreement
does not call for a "closed shop," if the railroads were permitted to pay nonunion men a less wage, the union would gradually disappear from the service,
and the entire object of the collective agreement defeated.
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the part of the courts to construe the contract so as to strengthen
rather than weaken the accomplishment of the union's objectives in
collective bargaining.
The two recent South Carolina cases of Johnson v. American
Railway Express Co., 2 6 and Marshall v. Charleston & W. C. Ry.
Co., 2 7 which hold that an employee injured by the employer's breach

of the union-employer agreement respecting due process in the
method of discharge, are, therefore, not only in accord with the trend
of American law 28 in this field, but they constitute hopeful indications
of a sympathetic attitude upon the part of the southern judiciary
toward the significance of the unionization of southern industry.
IRviN E. EiRB.

Landlord and Tenant-Liability for Personal Injuries Caused
By Breach of Landlord's Agreement to Repair.
Plaintiff, an infant of a tenant, was injured by the falling of a
door due to defective hinges. In the lease, the lessors (defendants)
had agreed to keep the premises in good repair at all times during the
tenancy. On demurrer, held the action was ex contractu; only such
damages are recoverable as were reasonably within the contemplation
of the parties when the contract was made; and damages for personal
injuries are too remote. Defendant's demurrer upheld."
In the absence of statute, 2 or of a valid covenant or stipulation in
the lease, 3 the lessor is not bound to make ordinary repairs to the
leased premises, 4 nor is he bound to pay for such repairs made by the
"Supra note 12.
= Supra note 12.
Rice, Collective Labor Agreements In American Law, (1932) 44 HARV. L.
Rtv. 572; Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law (1925) 10
ST. Louis L. Rav. 1; WiTmr, THE GoVERNMENT IN LABOR DIsPUTXs
(1932).
' Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corporation, 162 S. E. 329 (S. C.
1932).
'Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291, 205 N. W. 128 (1925); Smithfield Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N. C. 255, 72 S. E. 312 (1911) ; see Bushman v. Bushman, 311 Mo. 551, 279 S. W. 122, 126 (1925).
Some jurisdictions have by statute imposed an obligation to repair and made
the lessor liable in tort. Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1927);
Jarchin v. Rubin, 128 Misc. 437, 218 N. Y. Supp. 269 (1926).
'Lesser v. Kline, 101 Conn. 740, 127 Atl. 279 (1925); Cox v. Walter M.
Lawney Co., 35 Ga. 51, 132 S. E. 257 (1926) ; Fields v. Ogburn, 178 N. C. 407,
100 S. E. 583 (1919) ; Hudson v. Anson Real Estate & Insurance Co., 185 N. C.
342, 117 S.E. 165 (1923).
"Farber v. Greenberg, 98 Cal. App. 675, 277 Pac. 534 (1929) ; Newman v.
Golden, 108 Conn. 676, 144 At. 467 (1929); Richmond v. Standard Elkhorn
Coal Co., 222 Ky. 150, 300 S. W. 359, 58 A. L. R. 1423 (1927) ; Duffy v. Hartsfield, 180 N. C. 151, 104 S. E. 139 (1920) (especially where the defects are
apparent when the lease is made).

